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COMMENT

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
SUBSEQUENT TO CORPORATE LIQUIDATION
E. McGRUDER FARs, JR.*

A distinct set of tax problems arise upon the dissolution of a
corporation. First, the distribution of the corporate assets in the form
of liquidating dividends presents the question whether, by nature,
they are true dividends at all or merely a return of invested capital.
To the extent that the distribution represents a return of capital,
it is non-taxable, not being "income" within the meaning of the
tax statutes.' Since it rarely happens that a shareholder receives upon
distribution the exact amount that he has invested, at nearly every
corporate dissolution a second problem presents itself of how to treat
his gain or loss-as an ordinary gain or loss, or as a capital gain or loss.
A capital gain or loss results from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset, which is defined in general as any property held by the taxpayer, whether or not connected with his trade or business, with certain enumerated exceptions. 2 The sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for more than six months results in a long-term capital gain or
loss; if held for six months or less there is a short-term capital gain
or loss. 3 Section 115 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code classifies a distribution in complete liquidation as a capital transaction, producing
4
capital gain or loss.

The tax advantage or disadvantage of having a gain or loss classified as a capital one is apparent when the method of computing the
amount to be included on the individual's return is observed. Several steps are required for such computation. All short-term capital
gains and losses are taken together to determine net short-term
capital gain or loss. All long-term capital gains and losses are taken
together to determine net long-term capital gain or loss. Then the
net of the long and short term transactions are taken together to determine net gain or loss from the sale or exchange of all capital assets.5
Net gain so computed is included as gross income for the year it
*Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
"Henderson, Introduction To Income Taxation (1943) § 48.
-Int. Rev. Code § 117 (a).
"Int. Rev. Code § 117 (b)
'Int. Rev. Code § u15 (c). "Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of
a corporation shall be treated in full payment in exchange for stock...."
'Int. Rev. Code § 117 (a).
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is incurred. However, certain tax advantages are obtained under the
Code. For tax years beginning before October 2o, 1951, only 50 per

cent of long-term capital gains and losses were taken into account in
determining long-term gain or loss.6 A tax advantage resulted when
dealing with long-term capital gains, because only 50 per cent of them
were included. A disadvantage resulted when dealing with long-term
capital losses, because only 50 per cent of them were deductible. Shortterm transactions were taken into account loo per cent.
By the Revenue Act of 1951, this law was changed so that for
tax years beginning after October 2o, 1951, all capital gains and losses

are taken into account zoo per cent. However, relief is now granted
by allowing a deduction from gross income equal to 50 per cent of the
excess of net long-term capital gain over net short-term loss. 7 In some
cases the new is more advantageous to the taxpayer, in others less
advantageous, and in still others the result is the same under both the
old and new law.8
6Int. Rev. Code § 117 (b).
7

Int. Rev. Code § 2 3 (ee), 117 (b).
"Under the old law, $i of short-term capital loss offset $2 of long-term capital
gain, as only 5o percent of long-term gains were taken into account. Under the
new law, a short-term capital loss will offset a long-term capital gain dollar for
dollar, as loo per cent of long-term capital gain is taken into account. Under the
old law, $i of short-term capital gain offset $2 of long-term capital loss, while under
the new law. a short-term capital gain offsets a long-term capital loss dollar for
dollar.
EXAMPLE ONE
NEW LAW
OLD LAW
$1o,ooo (1oo% recognized)
Long-term gain .... $io,ooo $5,ooo ( 50% recognized)
5,ooo (lOO% recognized)
5,0o0 (oo% recognized)
5,ooo
Short-term loss ....
Net gain from capital
$o
transactions .............
S 5,000
Deduction from gross
income-(5o% of excess of
net long-term gain over
2,500
o
short-term loss) ..........
Capital gains subject
So
to tax ...................
$2,500
EXAMPLE TWO
OLD LAW
Short-term gain . .$1o,ooo $io,ooo (oo% recognized)
5,ooo ( 5o% recognized)
Long-term loss .. loooo
Net Gain from
capital transactions ...... $5,ooo
Deduction from gross income. o
Capital gains subject
$ 5,000
to tax .................

NEW LAW
Sio,ooo (oo% recognized)
10,000 (oo%
recognized)
$0
0

So
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When dealing with a net capital gain, other advantages are found
in the alternative method of tax liability computation, which in effect places a maximum rate of 26 per cent on long-term capital gains, 9
in contrast with individual rates up to 88 per cent of net income. From
the above it can be seen that in many instances a capital gain is preferable to an ordinary gain.
Net loss from the sale or exchange of capital assets can be used to
offset an individual's ordinary income, but only to the extent of
$i,ooo in the year of loss. 10 However, under Code Section 117 (e) (i),
an individual sustaining a net capital loss may carry over such loss to
each of the five succeeding years as a short-term capital loss. Since the
loss carry-over is treated as a short-term loss, it can be used only to
offset capital gains, plus $1,ooo of ordinary income in each of the later
years.
For example, if T had sustained a net capital loss of $20,000 in
1952, only $i,ooo could be used to offset his ordinary income for that
year. If in 1953, T has a capital gain of $2,000, the $ig,oo loss balance
from the previous year can be used to offset this gain, and another
$i,ooo used to offset ordinary income for 1953. If during the next four
succeeding years T has no capital gains against which to apply his
loss carry-over, the maximum $i,ooo deduction against ordinary income would be the only one to which he is entitled. The tax disadvantage of having a loss classified as a capital one is apparent from
this example, where only $8,ooo in deductions were allowed over a
six year period ($i,ooo in each year except 1953 when $3,000 was allowed), although the ecomonic loss to the taxpayer was $2o,ooo.
The tax treatment of other types of losses is too varied to discuss
here. Suffice it to say that other losses can usually be used to offset
ordinary income in the year of loss, with no $i,ooo limitation. Special
carry-over provisions apply in certain instances.'
Subsequent Repayments by Distributee-Shareholders
The problem of classifying a transaction as an ordinary or capital
one takes on added complications when in a year subsequent to what
purports to be a final liquidation it is discovered that the corporation
"The 26 per cent rate is applicable for the calendar
tax years beginning after October 31, 1951, and before
method of computing the alternative tax is effective for
on or
2 after October 20, 1951. Sec. 322 (d), Revenue Act of
DInt. Rev. Code § 117 (d) (2).
"Int. Rev. Code § 122 (b) (1, 2).

year 1952 and for other
November 1, 1953. The
taxable years beginning
1951.
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has hidden assets or liabilities. It is not unusual to discover at a later
time that the corporation has hidden assets which require distribution, or hidden liabilities which must be satisfied. An obvious example is the situation in which after the apparently final distribution
the corporaton becomes entitled to a tax refund, or is obliged to pay
an additional tax assessment. Under general corporation law doctrines,
a distributee-shareholder is entitled to his pro rata share of any assets
collected by the corporation after liquidation and in turn is liable for
the debts of the corporation.. 2 While Section 115 (c) treats distributions
in complete liquidation as capital transactions, no Code provision
prescribes how the shareholder should treat his subsequent payments
in discharge of his transferee liability for the corporation's debts.
The Commissioner's position in regard to such payments is that they
are capital losses, while the taxpayer's position has usually been that
the later payments are ordinary losses, not subject to the limitations
found in the case of capital losses.
At one time the difference in the two positions was less important
than it is today, as the taxpayer could have had his returns for previous
years reopened and adjusted, 13 provided the statute of liminations had
not run.14 Accordingly, in the case of a distributee later paying a
liability of the dissolved corporation, the taxpayer-distributee could
reopen his return which had reported the receipt of the liquidating
dividend, adjust downward the original capital transactions to reflect
the loss from the subsequent repayment, and collect a refund. This
practice of treating stockholder-distributee repayment as a reduction
of the liquidating dividend originally received was repudiated by
dictum of the Supreme Court in 1932. In the North American Oil
case 15 the Court declared: "If a taxpayer receives earnings under a
"The liability of stockholder-distributees is joint and several, each being liable
to the full extent of amounts received by him. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S.
589, 51 S. Ct. 6o8, 75 L. ed. 1289 (1930).
2'E.g., E. F. Cremin, 5 B. T. A. 1164 (1927); 0. B. Baker, 3 B. T. A. 118o (1926).
"Reg. iln, Sec. 29.322-7. Unless a claim for creditor refund of an overpayment
is filed within three years from the time the return was filed by the taxpayer, or
within two years from the time the tax was paid, the commissioner is prohibited
from allowing or making a credit or refund.
''North American Oil Co. v. Burnett, 286 U. S. 417, 52 S. Ct. 613, 76 L. ed.
1197 (1932). The taxpayer had received money in 1917 as the result of winning
a dispute with the government. The government took an immediate appeal, but
settled with the taxpayer in 1922. The Supreme Court held the income was realized
in 1917, not in 1922, the year in which the litigation with the government was
finally terminated.
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claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to return [on his tax form], even
though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the
money, and even though he may still be adjudged to restore its equivalent."16
Since this decision the courts and the Commissioner have considered that the stockholder-distributee payment of a corporation
liability no longer could be used to reduce the liquidating dividend.
It is suggested by a well considered note in the Yale Law Journal 17
that the stockholder-distributee liability payments might well be
specifically excepted from the rule barring reopening of prior returns,
since it is the only significant situation in which the original "claim
of right" receipt is a capital event.
The taxpayer's postion that the subsequent payment should be
treated as an ordinary loss was upheld in the 195o decision of Commissioner v. Switlik. s In that case the shareholders of a corporation
received final distribution in complete liquidation in 1941, each reporting his profit on the distribution as long-term capital gain. In 1942
the Commssioner assessed tax deficiencies against the corporation for
the years 194o and 1941. There being no corporate funds with which
to pay the deficiencies, the shareholder-distributees themselves paid
the assessments in 1944. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
upheld the Tax Court's decision that, as the 1944 payments did not
represent losses from the sale or exchange of capital assets, they were
fully deductible in that year as ordinary losses. 19 The holding is
based on the well-established annual accounting concept that each year
20
is a separate unit for tax purposes.
Doubt was cast upon the Switlik case rule last year when the Commissioner's position that a subsequent payment by a share-holderdistributee is a capital loss was upheld in Commissioner v. Bauer.21 In
that case the two shareholder-officers of a corporation received liquidating dividends pursuant to a plan of total liquidation during the
years 1937 through 194o, and reported their profits as long-term
capital gains in those years. At the time of the final liquidating dividend in 194o, a tort suit was pending against the corporation and
1 -286 U. S. 417, 424, 52 S. Ct. 613, 615, 77 L. ed.

1197, 1200 (1932) [italics supplied].
17Note (1952) 61 Yale L. J. io8i, 1o89.
8184 F. (2d) 299 (C. A. 3 d, 195o).
'The taxpayers had claimed as deductions the losses they incurred as "losses
incurred in a transaction entered into for profit." Int. Rev. Code 23 (e) (2).
01Henderson, Introduction To Income Taxation (1934) § 3.
"193 F. (2d) 734 (C. A. 2d, 1942).
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against one of the shareholder-officers, Frederick R. Bauer, individually. In 1944, the two taxpayers were required to, and did, pay the
judgment against the corporation, of whose assets they were transferees. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, reversing the
Tax Court's decision based on the Switlik case, held that since the
liabilities which the taxpayers incurred under the judgment would not
have existed except for the distribution, the two transactions should
be tied together.22 Therefore, the 1944 payments on the judgment were
treated as capital losses, even though one of the taxpayers incurred
liability under the judgment as an officer as well as a distributee. This
adoption of the Commissioner's position is to the disadvantage of the
taxpayer, for under the law before October 20, 1951 discussed earlier,
only 50 per cent of the long term loss was deductible.2 3 Even under
the law today, which takes into account ioo per cent of all losses, the
limitation that a capital loss can be used only to offset capital gains,
plus $1,ooo of ordinary income, would be to the individual's detri24
ment in many cases.

This conflict between the Courts of the Second and Third Circuits
in cases involving similar fact situations caused the Supreme Court
of the United States to grant certiorari in the Bauer case, now under
the title of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner.2 5 Adopting the view of the
court below that the two transactions should be treated as one, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Black declared: "The losses
here fall squarely within the definition of 'capital losses' contained in
these sections [Int. Rev. Code Section 23, Section 115]. Taxpayers were
required to pay the judgment because of liability imposed on them as
transferees of liquidation distribution assets. And it is plain that their
liability as transferees was not based on any ordinary business transaction of theirs apart from the liquidation proceedings. It is not even
denied that had this judgment been paid after liquidation, but during the year 1940, the losses would have been treated as capital ones.
For payment during 1940 would simply have reduced the amount of
26
capital gains received during the year."
Continuing, the Court observed: "It is contended, however, that this
payment which would have been a capital transaction in 1940 was
transformed into an ordinary business transaction in 1944 because of
2Commissioner v. Bauer, 193 F. (2d) 734, 735 (C. A. 2d, 1952).
2Int. Rev. Code § 117 (b).
24Int. Rev. Code § 122 (d) (2).
25344 U. S. 6, 73 S. Ct. 71, 97 L. ed. 19 (1952).
273 S. Ct. 71, 73, 97 L. ed. 19, 21 (1952).
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the well established principle that each taxable year is a separate unit
for tax accounting purposes. United States v. Lewis, 340 U. S. 590;
North American Oil Co. v. Burnett, 286 U. S. 417. But this principle is not breached by considering all the 1937-1944 liquidation
events in order to classify the nature of the 3944 loss for tax purposes.
Such an examination is not an attempt to reopen and readjust the
1937 to 1940 tax returns, an action that would be inconsistent with
27
the annual tax accounting principle."
In view of the Arrowsmith decision, taxpayer-distributees will ask
whether they can do anything to minimize their income taxes. Where
it appears that subsequent to the termination of corporate activity,
liability may still arise, tax advantages could possibly be obtained by
leaving with the corporation sufficient funds to cover such contingent
liability. There would be in effect a partial final distribution with
the reservation of a contingency fund. Any future payment of corporate liability would then be made directly from this fund. By this
means, the distributee would avoid being taxed on the part of the
liquidating dividends which he received only to pay back later. Such
a device could have prevented the difficulty in the Bauer case, where
the suit resulting in ultimate liability was in litigation at the time of
the final liquidating dividend. For individuals on a cash accounting
basis, this retention would have an added advantage even if the fund
were not actually used, as its distribution in a later year would allow
the taxpayer to spread his gains over more than one year, thus taking
advantage of lower surtax brackets.
There are three capacities in which a shareholder of a corporation
may be liable directly or indirectly for the debts of the corporation.
First, the shareholder indirectly pays when the corporation itself satisfies liability, as would be the case where a reserve fund is retained.
Second, the shareholder may be liable in his capacity as distributee of
the corporate assets. Third, he may be individually liable as an officer
or agent of the corporation. The last liability would arise as the result
of a tort action against the individual, in which case the corporation
would also be subject to suit under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The capacity in which one is sued or pays is apparently an important
factor in determining the classification of the subsequent payment as a
capital or an ordinary loss.
The decision in the Arrowsmith case appears to be limited to the
situation in which the shareholder makes payment in his capacity as
"73 S. Ct. 71, 73, 97 L. ed. 19, 21 (1952) [italics supplied].
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distributee. The language of the Court is: "While there was liability
against him [Bauer] in both capacities [as an officer and as a transferee], the individual judgment against him was for the whole amount.
His payment of only half the judgment indicates that both he and
the other transferee were paying in their capacities as such. We see
no reason for giving Bauer a preferred tax position." 28 The implication is that by paying in a personal capacity, rather than as a distributee, the transaction would be classified as an ordinary loss with the
usual tax advantages. As an illustration, consider a small corporation
where the officers are the only stockholders. After complete liquidation, a tort suit is threatened, and the tort is one for which the officers individually, as well as the corporation, are liable, A tax advantage could apparently be obtained by requesting the plaintiff to
sue the officers in that capacity, rather than as distributees. Possibly
a promise to place funds in the hands of the court pending the outcome of the litigation would be inducement even to the most hostile
plaintiffs. Under these circumstances the same persons would be
paying the same amount, but if the distributees made payment in the
capacity of individual officers, the loss would be an ordinary one,
whereas if they paid as distributee-shareholders, the loss would be
considered a capital one.
Subsequent Receipts by Distributee-Shareholders
The Arrowsmith decision that subsequent payments by distributee-shareholders in satisfaction of corporate debts should be treated
as capital losses presumably strengthens the rule that if property
received in exchange for stock has no market value the transaction
is not closed and later receipts or collections can result in capital
29
gains.
It may, however, weaken the decision in Osenbach v. Commis273 S. Ct. 71, 73, 97 L. ed. 19, 21 (1952).
"Westover v. Smith, 173 F. (ad) 9o (CA. 9 th, 1949). Where the owner of all
the stock of a corporation, on the dissolution of the corporation, received an assignment of a valuable royalty contract, the fair market value of which could not
be ascertained, royalty payments thereunder in later years were treated as payments in exchange for stock and taxed as capital gain rather than as ordinary income. The decision is based on the rule that where the assets received in exchange
for stock have no market value at that time, the transaction remains open until
all payments are completed. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404, 51 S. Ct. 550, 75 L. ed.
1143 (1930).
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sioner3o that collections on notes received by taxpayers in a Code
Section 112 (B) (7)31 liquidation are ordinary income. That ruling was
based on the ground that the distribution in kind in exchange for
their stock was a closed transaction. Under the Arrowsmith case it
is possible that a court might find that though there was no subsequent sale or exchange of the capital assets so received, yet the earlier
liquidation distribution could be looked to in order to classify the
nature of the later gain, as a capital gain.
The Arrowsmith decision will be of further significance when
subsequent to apparent final liquidation its is discovered that the
corporation has further assets to which the shareholders are entitled.
If under appropriate state law the corporation is still in existence for
32
the purpose of collecting these assets, no particular problem will arise.
In such case the corporation will collect the assets, and distribute them
to the shareholders in further liquidation, a capital transaction.
If under state law, the shareholders themsleves can bring the action
to collect the assets, a more complicated problem may arise, for then
the taxpayer would again be presented the question of whether his recovery is a capital gain or an ordinary gain. Such a possibility is foreseen in Justice Jackson's dissent in Arrowsmith. "Suppose that subsequent to liquidation it is found that a corporation has undisclosed
claims instead of liabilities, and that under applicable state law they
may be prosecuted for the benefit of the stockholders. The logic of
the Court's decision here, if adhered to, would result in a lesser return
to the government than if the recoveries were considered ordinary
income. Would it be so clear that this is a capital loss [transaction]
33
if the shoe were on the other foot?"
0198 F. (2d) 235 (C. A. 4th, 1952) affirming 17 T. C. 797. Taxpayer, as a
stockholder in a corporation liquidation under the provisions of Code § 112 (b)
(7), received in kind, certain loans, discounts, mortgages and other claims. Collections were later made thereon. Held, the amounts received on collections were ordinary income and not capital gain, on the ground that the subsequent dealings with
the loans, etc., did not involve sale or exchange, but collection, and hence could
not qualify as capital transactions, even though the assets had originated in the
closed, completed liquidation.
mCode § 112 (b) (7) provides relief in the form of an election as to the recognition of gain in certain corporate liquidations occurring within one calendar month
in 1951 or 1952. See Eaton, Liquidation Under Section 112 (b) (7), (1952), 38 Va.
L. Rev. x.
'When a corporation is dissolved, its affairs are usually wound up by a receiver or trustees in dissolution. The corporate existence is continued for the
purpose of liquidating the assets and paying the debts, and such receiver or trustees stand in place of the corporation for such purposes.
'73 S. Ct. 71, 74, 97 L. ed. 19, 22 (1952).
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This writer has been able to find no cases directly on the point.
However, it is doubtful if mere "prosecution for the benefit of the
stockholders" by the corporation would be sufficient to raise a doubt
of whether the recovery is a capital or ordinary gain. If the funds pass
through the hands of the corporation to the shareholders, it would
appear that this would be a corporate distribution resulting in capital
gain to the shareholder. If, however, the recovery is made directly by
the shareholder for his own benefit, then the nature of the transaction
is doubtful. Applying the Arrowsmith decision, the gain would be a
capital gain.
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